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I. RELOCATION
N the area of family law, one of the most hotly discussed areas has
been the right, or lack thereof, of a custodial parent to move a signifi-
cant distance away from the noncustodial parent. Currently, across
the United States, the trend is toward allowing the custodial parent to
relocate. An example is the Supreme Court of Colorado's statement in
In re Francis, that in a relocation case there is "a presumption that the
custodial parent's choice to move with the children should generally be
allowed."'
One of the more highly discussed appellate opinions in this area is the
California Supreme Court's Burgess decision, which relied, to some ex-
tent, on social science research done by Professor Judith Wallerstein and
was presented in her amica curiae brief.2 However, her research has been
highly criticized by at least one other professional in this area.3
In Texas, there are several statutory guidelines that should guide the
courts, to some extent, in relocation cases. First is the state's legislatively
codified public policy, which is to:
(1) assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with
parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the
child;
(2) provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child;
and
(3) encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their
child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.4
In addition, the Family Code states that if a parent is appointed as sole
managing conservator, then that parent should have the exclusive right
"to establish the primary residence of the child."'5 If the parties enter into
an agreement for Joint Managing Conservatorship, then the court:
shall render an order appointing the parents as joint managing con-
servators only if the agreement:
(1) designates the conservator who has the exclusive right to es-
tablish the primary residence of the child and:
1. In re Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 (Colo. 1996).
2. In re Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996).
3. Richard A. Warshak, Ph.D., Social Science and Children's Best Interests in Reloca-
tion Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83 (Spring 2000).
4. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a) (Vernon 2002).
5. Id. § 153.132(1).
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(A) establishes, until modified by further order, the geo-
graphic area within which the conservator shall maintain the
child's primary residence; or
(B) specifies that the conservator may establish the child's pri-
mary residence without regard to geographic location.6
If the parents do not reach an agreement regarding conservatorship, and
the court orders that the parties be Joint Managing Conservators, then
the court shall:
(1) designate the conservator who has the exclusive right to deter-
mine the primary residence of the child and:
(A) establish, until modified by further order, a geographic area
consisting of the county in which the child is to reside and any
contiguous county thereto within which the conservator shall
maintain the child's primary residence; or
(B) specify that the conservator may determine the child's pri-
mary residence without regard to geographic location.
7
This background of competing policies, questionable social science, and
sparse statutes is the background most family law attorneys have been
dealing with in Texas. Texas family law attorneys thought they would
finally get some guidance from the Texas Supreme Court when it granted
writ in the case of Lenz v. Lenz.8 However, after giving a good summary
of the issues and history of relocation cases, the Texas Supreme Court did
little. The minor contribution it did offer was to make a bright line deter-
mination that a jury verdict regarding whether a residence restriction
should be lifted or imposed is binding on the trial court, and that the
jury's decision cannot be contravened by the trial court. 9
In Lenz, the mother and father were a German couple who were mar-
ried and living in Germany. They had their first child in 1986 in Germany
and then relocated to Phoenix, Arizona in 1991 because of Father's job. 10
While in Arizona the parties entered into a legal separation agreement,
which was adopted by the Arizona courts. The agreement and consent
decree stated that the parents had joint custody, that the mother was the
primary residential parent, that the father had regularly scheduled visita-
tion, and that the parents intended to move to San Antonio, Texas and
restricted the children's residence to Texas." The entire family did end
up moving to Texas, and then in 1998, the mother initiated divorce pro-
ceedings, which resulted in the court adopting the Arizona consent
decree.
Shortly after the divorce, the mother filed a modification action seek-
ing to have the residency restriction lifted so that she could move back to
6. Id. § 153.133(a)(1) (emphasis added).
7. Id. § 153.134(b)(1).
8. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. 2002).
9. Id. at 20.




Germany and remarry.12 After a jury trial, the jury found that the
mother should "have the exclusive right to determine the children's pri-
mary residence."' 13 However, the trial court limited the jury's finding, al-
lowing the mother to pick the children's primary residence as long as it
was in Bexar County, Texas.' 4
The Texas Supreme Court did engage in a discussion regarding reloca-
tion cases, the history and evolution of recolation jurisprudence, and the
competing approaches of other states. However, the actual ruling of the
supreme court is limited to simply stating that since there was more than
a scintilla of evidence to support the jury's finding that the mother should
have the exclusive right to determine the children's primary residence,
the trial court had no authority to contravene that verdict by restricting
the children's residence to Bexar County, Texas.
15
The Lenz case was delivered on June 6, 2002, coincidentally also on
June 6, 2002, the El Paso Court of Appeals decided the case of Bates v.
Tesar,16 and family law practitioners in Texas finally received some gui-
dance on the substantive issues involved in relocation cases.
In Bates, the mother and father were divorced in 1996, with the Mother
being designated as the sole managing conservator. The mother was also
given the exclusive right to establish the children's primary residence
without regard to geographic limitation. 17 The mother exercised this
right by moving with the children and her new husband from Dallas
County to Port Lavaca, which is about 362 miles or a six and a half hour
drive from Dallas. 8 She did not give notice as required by her decree,
and the father did not find out that she was moving on June 14th until
June 11th, just three days prior. The father obtained a restraining order
that prohibited moving the children, but it was not served on the mother
until she had already accomplished the move. 19 A temporary hearing was
held before the associate judge on August 27, 1999 and an order was ren-
dered requiring that the children be returned to Dallas and enrolled in
school. On appeal to the trial court, the associate judge's requirement
that the children be moved back to Dallas was overturned, and the chil-
dren stayed in Port Lavaca during the pendency of the case.
After the final hearing, the court appointed the parents as joint manag-
ing conservators, ordered that the children be returned to Dallas, and
restricted the primary residence of the children to Dallas County.20 The
first issue of note in the case was deciding on the appropriate burden of
proof. The court reviewed and summarized the differing approaches of
12. Id.
13. Id. at 12-13.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 21.
16. Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 411 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
17. Id. at 415.
18. Id. at 416.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 41.9-20.
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the states across the nation regarding the burden of proof in relocation
cases as the following:
Other states require the custodial parent to obtain judicial approval
prior to relocation, thus placing the burden of proof on the custodial
parent to prove that the move is in the best interest of the child. Still
others have adopted a presumptive right of the custodial parent to
change the residence of a child so long as removal would not be det-
rimental to the child and thus have placed the burden of persuasion
on the non-custodial parent in a modification proceeding. Colorado
has established a presumption in the custodial parent's favor which is
triggered once the custodial parent presents a prima facie case dem-
onstrating a sensible reason for the move; the burden then shifts to
the non-custodial parent to establish that the move is not in the best
interest of the child. The Minnesota Supreme Court has found an
implicit statutory presumption that removal is permitted and re-
quires the party opposing removal to present a prima facie case that
relocation is not in the best interest of the child and would endanger
the child's health and well-being. Washington places the burden on a
non-residential parent who seeks a domicile restriction. Tennessee
permits the custodial parent to remove the child from the jurisdiction
unless the non-custodial parent can show that the motive for the re-
location is intended to defeat visitation rights or the move evidences
such bad judgment and is so potentially harmful to the child that
custody should be changed. 21
Rather than state a major policy decision regarding the proper burden of
proof in Texas relocation cases, the court adopted a very simple method
for determining the burden of proof. The burden of proof, as is almost
always the case, is on the moving party. 22 In the Bates case, this resulted
in the father having the burden of proof to show the required change in
circumstances. However, if the original decree had contained a geo-
graphic limitation on the mother's exclusive right to determine the chil-
dren's primary residence, then the burden of proof would have been on
the mother to show a change of circumstances that necessitated the lifting
of the restriction.
In Bates, the father was able to carry his burden of proof, mainly due to
the distance from Dallas to Port Lavaca and the effect the distance would
have on his relationship with his children. The court did not establish a
bright line rule that a move is always a material and substantial change,
but approved of language from a New Mexico Supreme Court case that
stated "it is difficult to imagine an instance in which a proposed reloca-
tion will not render an existing parenting plan or custody-and-visitation
arrangement unworkable. '23 The Texas court went on to give some gui-
dance for future cases and stated that:
21. Id. at 422-24.
22. Id. at 424.
23. Id. at 430 (citing Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991)).
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[I]f the custodial parent moves a significant distance, a finding of
changed circumstances may be appropriate. Such a decision is neces-
sarily fact intensive but we can glean from the case law certain fac-
tors which the court should consider:
the distance involved;
the quality of the relationship between the non-custodial parent
and the child;
the nature and quantity of the child's contacts with the non-custo-
dial parent, both de jure and de facto;
whether the relocation would deprive the non-custodial parent of
regular and meaningful access to the children;
the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child's
future contact with the non-custodial parent;
the motive for the move;
the motive for opposing the move;
the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-cus-
todial parent and the child through suitable visitation arrange-
ments; and
the proximity, availability, and safety of travel arrangements. 24
Also of note was the mother's claim that the trial court's ruling had
infringed upon her Constitutional right to travel. In an otherwise long
opinion, the court made short work of this argument and stated that "we
find no merit to [the mother's] claim that the trial court's action infringes
on her U.S. Constitutional right to travel. '25
After both the Lenz and Bates decisions, the Austin Court of Appeals
decided Echols v. Olivarez.26 In Echols, the mother and father were
never married but lived together for two years after their child was born.
In 1997, an order was entered appointing the parents as joint managing
conservators and giving the mother the right to establish the child's pri-
mary residence within Texas.27
In 2000, the mother had a second child, and after her maternity leave,
she was offered a promotion with an eight percent pay increase and a ten
percent salary bonus, but the job was in Tennessee. 28 The mother then
filed a modification action seeking to have the residency restriction lifted
so that she could move to Tennessee. The trial court granted the modifi-
cation, and the father appealed. 29
The Austin Court of Appeals noted that Texas Family Code section
153.001 provides that it is the public policy of the State of Texas to "as-
sure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents
who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child ... and
24. Id.
25. Id. at 437.
26. Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).





encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their child
after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage. ' 30 How-
ever, even considering this clearly stated policy the court went on to say:
in the context of relocation cases, slavish adherence to such policy
ignores the realities of a family that has been dissolved. After the
dissolution of the family, each parent must establish a separate life.
And in today's society, it is unrealistic to expect that any family,
whether intact or not, will remain in one geographic location for an
extended period of time.31
In the end, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court, and the mother
was allowed to move to Tennessee.
Lastly, in Franco v. Franco,32 the parents of twin daughters were di-
vorced in 1996, were designated joint managing conservators, and each
parent was to have possession during alternating one-week periods.
Neither parent was designated as the primary custodian, the children's
residence was restricted to El Paso county, and the shared custody ar-
rangement (one-week-on-one-week-off) was followed by the parents af-
ter the divorce. 33
In 1999, the mother filed a modification action seeking to be desig-
nated as the primary custodian with the father having standard possession
and seeking to be allowed to move with the children from El Paso County
to San Antonio. The father countered, asking that he be designated as
the primary custodian and that the mother have standard possession. 34
The trial court retained the joint managing conservatorship, gave the
mother the exclusive right to establish the children's primary residence,
and gave the father received standard possession.35 The court of appeals
affirmed and conducted an extensive review of the facts of the case, in-
cluding the fact that each parent had remarried, that the mother had been
offered a job in San Antonio, and that the father had often expressed a
desire to move to New Orleans. The court of appeals also compared the
mother's current home to her potential home in San Antonio. In the end,
the trial court's decision was affirmed, as the father did not show that that
the modification order amounted to a clear abuse of discretion.36
It is interesting to note that the Franco decision goes into an extensive
discussion regarding the facts of the case as they relate to the relocation
issue and an extensive discussion of the law regarding relocation cases.
However, the facts in Franco are that the father, prior to the modifica-
tion, had possession of the children every other week, the same amount
of time as the Mother. After the modification, he had a long-distance
standard possession order. The court of appeals discussed the trial
30. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001(a) (Vernon 2002).
31. Echols, 85 S.W.3d at 480.
32. Franco v. Franco, 81 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
33. Id. at 321-22.
34. Id. at 322.




court's ruling that the Mother be allowed to relocate to San Antonio and
the legal and factual basis for this. The court of appeals, however, did not
discuss the basis, legal or factual, for the trial court's elimination of the
shared custodial arrangement the parties had been living under for sev-
eral years.
To summarize, in Lenz, there was a residency restriction, which was
lifted by the jury so the mother was allowed to move from Texas to Ger-
many. In Bates, the mother was the sole managing conservator with no
residency restriction, but she was required to move back to Dallas from
Port Lavaca. In Echols, there was a residency restriction limited to the
state of Texas, which was lifted to allow the mother to move to Tennessee.
Lastly, in Franco, there was a residency restriction and a shared custodial
arrangement, both of which were eliminated to allow the mother to move
with the children from El Paso County to San Antonio.
II. CHILD SUPPORT
Most of the cases dealing with child support during the survey period
dealt with the collection and payment of arrearages. In the case In re
A.M.,37 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals clarified the amount and
type of offsets and reimbursements available to an obligor against his or
her arrearages. The court of appeals held that an obligor is entitled to an
offset or credit against child support arrearages for actual support pro-
vided by the obligor while the children were residing with the obligor.38
The offset is not limited to the date of service or appearance of the obli-
gor.39 The court of appeals also held that an obligor has a separate claim
for reimbursement against an obligee for the amount of actual support
paid to an obligee while the child resided with an obligor. Once an obli-
gor establishes an offset claim, the obligor is entitled to offset the full
amount of monthly child support accrued during the relevant time pe-
riod.40 Likewise, once an obligor establishes a reimbursement claim, the
obligor is entitled to be reimbursed by the obligee the full amount of
monthly child support paid during the relevant time period. The obligor
is not required to show the exact amount of expenditures because the
Family Code does not provide the court any discretion to reduce the off-
set or reimbursement amount.4' An obligor, therefore, has two distinct
coexisting remedies against an obligee seeking arrearages-an affirma-
tive defense and a claim for reimbursement, both of which the trial court
has no discretion to reduce once proven.
Although offsets and counterclaims for reimbursement are allowed
against arrearages, courts are otherwise prohibited from reducing the
37. In re A.M., 101 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
38. Id. at 489.
39. Id. at 485.
40. Id. at 489.
41. Id. at 485; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.008 (Vernon 2002).
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amount of child support arrearages. 42 In Attorney General of Texas v.
Stevens,43 the issue before the court was whether social security disability
benefits were a special type of credit that should reduce arrearages or at
least provide an offset to child support arrearages. In this case, the obli-
gor owed approximately $11,000 in arrearages and was ordered to make
weekly payments. A couple of months later, the obligor became dis-
abled, so the son, who had just turned 18, received a check from the So-
cial Security Administration for approximately $7,000 in accordance with
the benefit terms of the disability program.44 The obligor argued that the
$7,000 paid to his son should be credited against his arrearages. The
court of appeals held that disability payments made directly to a child are
not a special credit against a judgment for child support arrearages4 5
Additionally, the court of appeals held that trial courts are bound by the
offsets and counterclaims set forth in Texas Family Code Section
157.262(f), when rendering a money judgment for arrearages. The court
of appeals went on to hold that equitable factors also preclude this type
of special credit, as the payment of child support arrearages by an obligor
fulfills a duty to the child and reimburses the custodial parent for extra
resources expended to support the child.46 Payments made directly to the
child, as in this case, do not reimburse the custodial parent for extra re-
sources. Trial courts, therefore, do not have discretion to allow other
types of special credits outside of the code, equitable or otherwise.
In the case In re L. C. H.,4 7 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a
money judgment for arrearages in the amount of approximately $140,000
and reaffirmed that child support obligations are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy.
As for payment of arrearages, the San Antonio Court of Appeals in the
case In re A.M.E.,48 held that once the Attorney General provides Title
IV-D services to a party, the Attorney General is entitled to an assign-
ment of all arrearages in that case, and all child support and arrearages
payments must go through the Office of the Attorney General. Trial
courts may not ratify agreements between the parties for direct payments
in such a case.
In the case In re D.S.,49 the Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth
District, held that a trial court has discretion whether to follow the child
support guidelines in a modification action. In this case, a father ap-
pealed the trial court's denial of his requested modification to reduce
child support. In 1996, the mother and father reached an agreement for
42. Id. at 488; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.262 (Vernon 2002).
43. Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. Stevens, 84 S.W.3d 720 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2002, no pet.).
44. Id. at 721.
45. Id. at 724.
46. Id. at 726.
47. In re L.C.H., 80 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
48. In re A.M.E., 71 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).
49. In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
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child support that allowed the father to pay $500 per month while com-
pleting his orthopedic residency and then increase three years later to
$1,500 per month, assuming he would be in a lucrative private practice.50
At the end of the three years, the father chose to accept another surgical
residency instead of private practice. He filed a modification action
pleading, among other grounds, that it had been three years since the
child support order was rendered, and the support amount under that
order differed by either twenty percent or $100 from the amount he
should pay according to the child support guidelines. 51 The court of ap-
peals held that the father met the statutory grounds for a modification,52
but that the trial court still had discretion whether to follow the child
support guidelines in the modification action. It is a rebuttable presump-
tion that a child support order based on guidelines is in a child's best
interest. The court of appeals stated that in modification actions, the use
of the presumption is not mandatory as in other cases but only discretion-
ary.53 This discretion applies to modifications of both agreed and non-
agreed child support orders.
The El Paso Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's decision to award
above-guideline child support in a modification suit based, at least in part,
on the division of debt in the prior divorce proceeding.5 4 The court of
appeals also stated that a trial court has broad discretion to modify child
support orders.55 In supporting the trial court's equitable ruling, the
court of appeals did note that the evidence showed that the award was
reasonable and not arbitrary. 56
In Zorilla v. Wahid,57 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court decision to apply the guidelines to potential earnings of an
obligor. A mother argued that the father, a board-certified oncologist,
should be ordered to pay above guidelines because he could make more
than double what he was presently earning if he changed jobs.58 The
court of appeals stated that to support a finding of intentional underem-
ployment or unemployment, there must be sufficient proof that the obli-
gor caused his income to be reduced or eliminated for the purpose of
decreasing the child support obligation.59 The obligor's happiness in his
present position is also a factor for the court to consider. Here, the evi-
dence showed the father had never made more than what he was cur-
rently making, and he testified that he could not work the significantly
longer hours required for a higher salary.
Often times when one party files a modification action, the other party
50. Id. at 515.
51. Id. at 515-16; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.401 (Vernon 2002).
52. In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d at 521-22.
53. Id. at 522.
54. Hodson v. Keiser, 81 S.W.3d 363 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
55. Id. at 368.
56. Id. at 368-69.
57. Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
58. Id. at 253.
59. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.066 (Vernon 2002).
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promptly files a countermotion to modify. In Hargrave v. Lefever,60 the
father filed a motion to modify primary possession of the children. Prior
to the entry of final orders in his modification action, the mother filed a
motion to modify child support. The trial court signed a modification
order in the father's case and subsequently granted summary judgment
against the mother's modification citing her case was barred by res judi-
cata.61 The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
mother's case, holding that a parent is allowed to modify orders affecting
the parent-child relationship as often as circumstances materially and
substantially change,62 that the mother's child support modification was a
new ground for modification and not a claim that she was required to
assert in the father's possession modification, and that the order entered
in the father's modification action did not refer to the mother's pending
motion.63
Texas Family Code section 153.001 states generally that possession may
not be contingent on the payment of child support. In the case In re
A.N.H., 64 a father's child support obligation was suspended until such
time as his daughter expressed a desire to have contact with him. The
court of appeals held that although this contingent situation is not specifi-
cally addressed by the statute, the order violated the public policy behind
the statute in that the payment of child support and possession were
connected.
Some of the most interesting cases during the survey period deter-
mined the applicability of an administrative writ of withholding issued by
the Attorney General to collect significantly past due child support. In
the case In re A.D.,65 the Texas Supreme Court held that Attorney Gen-
eral-issued writs are not in violation of the Texas Constitution's ban on
retroactive laws.66 The court held that the former four-year limitation 67
was not a statute of limitations on the collection of child support arrear-
ages, but rather a limit on the trial court's jurisdiction to order withhold-
ing from an obligor's income for payment of child support.68 The court
stated that administrative writs do not place new liability on an obligor to
pay child support and, therefore, do not violate the Texas Constitution.69
The administrative writ is merely a procedural tool created to secure the
payment of an existing, perpetual liability.70 The court did not address
the dormancy statutes in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 71
60. Hargrave v. Lefever, 82 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
61. Id. at 526.
62. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.401 (Vernon 2002).
63. Hargrave, 82 S.W.3d at 527-28.
64. In re A.N.H., 70 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
65. In re A.D., 73 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. 2002).
66. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
67. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206 (Vernon 2002).
68. In re A.D., 73 S.W.3d at 247-48.
69. Id. at 248.
70. See Attorney Gen. of Tex. v. Redding, 60 S.W.3d 891 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no
pet.).
71. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 31.006 & 34.001 (Vernon 2002).
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The San Antonio Court of Appeals did visit the dormancy issue during
the survey period. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections
31.006 and 34.001 state generally that if a writ of execution is not issued
within ten years after a judgment, the judgment becomes dormant unless
revived by scire facias or by an action of debt brought within two years of
the date the judgment became dormant. 72 In the case In re T.L.K.,73 the
Attorney General attempted to enforce a father's child support obliga-
tion, including a child support judgment taken fifteen years prior to the
filing of the enforcement action. The father argued that the dormancy
provisions74 preclude enforcement of the child support judgment. The
court of appeals held that once unpaid child support is reduced to a judg-
ment, the judgment confirming the child support arrearages is subject to
the dormancy provisions. 75 The dormancy time period starts when the
judgment is signed, not when the individual monthly child support pay-
ments came due, despite the fact that the code specifically states that each
missed payment is a final judgment. 76 The court of appeals also held that
even though the dormancy provisions apply to child support judgments,
the Attorney General is exempt from the dormancy statutes because it
brings cases on behalf of the state.77
T.L.K.78 and, to a lesser extent the Swate79 case discussed below,
should significantly help the Office of the Attorney General collect the
millions of dollars owed in past due child support.
III. TERMINATION
Just as time does not dissolve court ordered child support, neither does
termination of an obligor's parental rights. In the Swate case,80 a father
failed to pay child support as ordered in the parents' divorce decree. The
mother filed suit to terminate his parental rights and confirm the child
support arrearages. The trial court granted the mother's suit to terminate
the father's parental rights and confirmed the child support arrearages
through the date of termination.8' On appeal, the father argued that he is
not obligated to pay the child support arrearage, as the termination order
absolves him from all duties between himself and the child.82 The Waco
Court of Appeals disagreed stating that an obligor is liable to a person
providing necessaries to persons to whom support is owed.83 The court
72. Id.
73. In re T.L.K., 90 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
74. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 31.006 & 34.001.
75. In re T.L.K., 90 S.W.3d at 837-40.
76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.261 (Vernon 2002).
77. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.061 (Vernon 2002); In re T.L.K., 90
S.W.3d at 839-40.
78. In re T.L.K., 90 S.W.3d at 833.
79. Swate v. Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied).
80. Id.
81. Id, at 765.
82. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206 (Vernon 2002).
83. See id. § 151.001.
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held that since child support is an obligation to a person for the benefit of
a child, the father's termination does not affect his obligation to satisfy a
debt for child support through the date of termination.8 4
The "inability to pay" affirmative defense to a motion for enforcement
of child support 85 also applies when termination of parental rights is
sought based on the failure to pay court ordered child support.86 In the
case In re J.M.M.,87 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that an obligor
may plead and prove this affirmative defense to termination under Texas
Family Code section 161.001(1)(F), but the failure to do so constituted a
waiver of the defense.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a father's termination based
on his failure to support the child for a period of one year ending within
six months of when the petition was filed as long as it is in the best inter-
est of the child. 88 In the M.A.N.M. case,8 9 a couple married when the
woman was eight months pregnant with another man's child. The child
was born with drugs in her system. Eventually, the mother moved out of
the husband's house, her rights were terminated, and the child was left in
the care of the husband. 90 The biological father paid some support to the
mother during her pregnancy, but did not provide any support to the hus-
band other than offer him money in exchange for visitation with the child.
The biological father began attempting to establish his parental rights in
February 1999, prior to the mother's termination. Over the next year and
half, he contacted Child Protective Services ("CPS"), who referred him to
Legal Aid, who referred him the Attorney General's office, who told him
they could not help him either. Finally, in May 2000, he was able to get a
private attorney, who informed him that a petition to terminate his rights
was already filed and, although he had left his information with CPS, they
served him by publication. 91
At the trial, the ad litem testified that termination was not in the child's
best interest because the father had developed a bond with the child. The
father's parents and the husband's mother testified that they all could
help raise the child. Nevertheless, the trial court found termination to be
in the child's best interest based, in part, on the testimony of the CPS
administrator that it would be difficult for the child to form any signifi-
cant attachment to the father because of the limited relationship they had
the first two years of the child's life.92 The court of appeals affirmed. The
dissent stated that CPS, Legal Aid, and the Attorney General's office
offered absolutely no help to the father, that the lapse of time argument
84. Swate, 72 S.W.3d at 771.
85. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 157.008 (Vernon 2002).
86. See id. § 161.001.
87. In re J.M.M., 80 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).
88. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(F) (Vernon 2002).
89. In re M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
90. Id. at 75.
91. Id. at 76.
92. Id. at 76-77.
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as grounds for termination in this case is unconscionable, and less drastic
means should have been considered. The dissent also stated that the hus-
band did not meet his burden to establish the father had the ability to pay
support because there was no evidence of the father's educational level,
employment history, earning potential or actual income.
In Horvatich v. TDPRS,93 the Austin Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded an order terminating a mother's parental rights. The court of
appeals held that there was legally sufficient evidence but not factually
sufficient evidence to find that the termination was in the best interest of
the child. The mother's poor parenting skills, general neglect, and no
plans to change in the future provided legally sufficient evidence to sup-
port termination. TDPRS failed to introduce evidence concerning the
children's current situation in foster care and the likelihood for adoption,
nor did TDPRS appear to have considered the mother's relatives as
placement options prior to termination proceedings.
Many of the termination cases during the survey period revolve around
the rights of imprisoned parents. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
and the Beaumont Court of Appeals both decided cases regarding an in-
carcerated parent's right to appear at a termination trial. In the case In re
D.S.,94 the trial court denied the mother's request for a bench warrant
without actually considering the request. The Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals reversed the order of termination stating that it is abuse of dis-
cretion when a trial court denies a request for a bench warrant without
first weighing all the relevant factors. The court listed certain factors the
trial court must consider before denying an incarcerated parent's request
to be present at the trial, including:
1. The cost and inconvenience of transporting the incarcerated parent
to court.
2. The security risk and danger to the court and the public of allowing
the incarcerated parent to attend court.
3. The substance of the matter.
4. The need of the fact finder to witness the incarcerated parent's
demeanor.
5. Whether it is a bench trial or jury trial.
6. Whether it is possible to delay the trial until the incarcerated parent
is released. 95
The court of appeals stated that after considering all the relevant fac-
tors, if the trial court has a reason to not permit the incarcerated parent
to personally appear, the court should permit that parent to appear by
telephone or other reasonable means.
In the case In re C.W.,96 an incarcerated mother's parental rights were
93. Horvatich v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Serv., 78 S.W.3d 594 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, no pet. h.).
94. In re D.S., 82 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
95. Id. at 745.
96. In re C.W., 65 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.).
[Vol. 561720
PARENT AND CHILD
terminated and she appealed claiming her due process rights to access the
courts were violated by only being able to appear by telephone. The
Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the termination stating that her
right to appear in court in civil cases is not absolute, and the trial court
and her attorney sufficiently protected her interests. The court also held
that the mother did "attend" the entire trial, albeit by telephone. 97
Texas Family Code section 161.001(1)(Q) provides grounds for termi-
nation of parental rights if a parent "knowingly engaged in criminal con-
duct that has resulted in the parent's conviction (i) of an offense and (ii)
confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not
less than two years from the date of filing the petition. '98 In the case In
re A.L.S., 99 a father received a ten-year probated sentence for burglary.
His probation was later revoked and he received a ten-year prison sen-
tence. The trial court terminated his parental rights based on section
161.001(1)(Q) of the Texas Family Code. The father argued on appeal
that his conviction did not result in the prison sentence, but rather it was
a technical violation of his parole. 100 The El Paso Court of Appeals dis-
agreed with the father's technical argument, holding that there was suffi-
cient evidence that his conduct ultimately led to his confinement and
inability to care for his child.
There has been much discussion as to whether the language "... for not
less than two years from the date of filing the petition,"10' means the two
years immediately prior to the termination petition being filed or for at
least two years after it is filed. The El Paso Court of Appeals held in the
A.L.S. 10 2 case that section 161.001(1)(Q) refers to the two years before
the petition is filed.'0 3 The court of appeals noted that to hold otherwise
would preclude the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Ser-
vices from completing a termination suit because adhering to the time
limitation10 4 imposed on them10 5 is a mandatory duty of the trial court.10 6
The Texarkana Court of Appeals in the case In re B.S.W.,10 7 gave us its
opinion on the ongoing question of whether the language in section
161.001(1)(Q) requires a parent's imprisonment and inability to care for
the child to be for at least two years immediately prior to the termination
petition being filed or for at least two years after it is filed. This court
joined a growing majority of other appellate courts in holding that the
97. Id. at 354.
98. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q) (Vernon 2002).
99. In re A.L.S., 74 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
100. Id. at 177.
101. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(Q)(ii) (Vernon 2002).
102. In re A.L.S., 74 S.W.3d at 177.
103. Id. at 183-84.
104. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401 (Vernon 2002).
105. But see In re B.M.R., 84 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)
(affirming an order terminating a father's parental rights based on his testimony that it
would be more than 2 years since the filing of the petition before he would be released
from prison and able to care for his child).
106. In re L.L., 65 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
107. In re B.S.W., 87 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. filed).
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statute requires confinement and inability to care for the child for at least
two years before the petition is filed.108 The Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals, however, held that the statute refers to the two years from the fil-
ing of the petition, meaning afterward. 109
In D.R.L.M.," 0 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that to satisfy
the two-year requirement, the parent must be confined or imprisoned and
not able to care for the child for at least two years from the filing date.
Since the parent in this case would not be imprisoned for at least two
years, the court of appeals found that the evidence supporting the termi-
nation based on this ground was legally insufficient.
Under Texas law, parental rights may be terminated if a parent know-
ingly places or allows a child to "remain in conditions or surroundings
which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of a child," '' or if
the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with per-
sons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child.""12 When reviewing terminations, the Texas Su-
preme Court held that the standard of review for appellate courts is
whether the evidence is such that the fact finder could reasonably form a
firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations." 3 The
Amarillo Court of Appeals in the case In re D.P.,114 defined "know-
ingly," as applied to the termination statutes, to mean a parent's actions
or inactions were done "in a knowing manner; with awareness, deliber-
ateness . . ." or "consciously, intelligently, willfully, or intentionally."' 15
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order terminating the
mother's parental rights because there was not sufficient factual evidence
that the mother acted "knowingly." The child's injuries were internal and
not visible, and there was no evidence as to how the child sustained the
injuries. An inference or suspicion is not enough to satisfy the "know-
ingly" requirement.
The termination statutes allow termination of parental rights of parents
with mental illnesses, deficiencies, or retardation. Texas Family Code sec-
tion 161.003 states generally that a court may order termination of paren-
tal rights if a parent has a mental illness or deficiency that renders the
parent unable to provide for the physical and emotional needs of the
child, and the parent's mental illness or deficiency, in all reasonable
probability, proved by clear and convincing evidence, will continue to
render the parent unable to provide for the child's needs until the child
turn eighteen years old. In Salas v. Texas Department of Protective and
108. Id. at 770.
109. In re IV., 61 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
110. In re D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).
111. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(D) (Vernon 2002).
112. Id. § 161.001(1)(E).
113. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002).
114. In re D.P., 96 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
115. Id. at 336 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252
(1976) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 872 (6th ed. 1990)).
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Regulatory Services,1 16 the El Paso Court of Appeals held that there was
reasonable probability that the mother's mental illness would continue
until the youngest child turned eighteen years old, and there was factually
and legally sufficient evidence that, because of her mental illness, she
could not adequately care for the children.
It is worth mentioning that even if the court of appeals in Salas found
that the mother's rights should not be terminated under section 161.003,
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted in the L.S.R.11 7 case that, as a
matter of law, mental retardation does not preclude a fact finder from
finding a parent "knowingly" neglected a child under section 161.001(D)
and (E).
The appellate courts issued opinions dealing with procedural matters in
a number of termination cases during the survey period. The Amarillo
Court of Appeals held that submitting a broad-form jury charge is correct
because the issue in termination cases is whether the parent-child rela-
tionship should be terminated, not the specific ground relied on for the
termination." 8 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals also upheld a broad-
form jury charge in the case In re J.M.M.1 9 In the case In re A.V.,' 20 the
Waco Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a termination holding
that the broad-form submission may have deprived the father of a jury
verdict agreed to by at least ten jurors. The Texas Supreme Court has
granted a petition for review in this case and hopefully will clarify the
split of opinion.
Texas Rule of Evidence 605 states generally that the presiding judge in
a trial may not testify as a witness in that trial. In the case In re
M.E.C.,' 21 the Waco Court of Appeals held that the admission of the
mother's jury charge, which included the judge's signature, as evidence in
the father's trial was not testimony by the judge in the trial, as prohibited
by Texas Rule of Evidence 605. The Beaumont Court Appeals also held
that temporary orders, permanency hearing orders, and memorandums of
agreement that were entered into evidence during a termination trial do
not violate Rule 605.122
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in G.C.,123 that in counties
where a statutory county court has concurrent jurisdiction with a district
court in family law matters and a termination case is heard in the statu-
tory county court, the parent is entitled to only a six-person jury.
In the E.L. T case,' 24 the mother's attorney requested a continuance
and competency evaluation because she could not understand the pro-
116. Salas v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 71 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 2002, no pet.).
117. In re L.S.R., 60 S.W.3d 376 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
118. In re K.S., 76 S.W.3d 36, 49 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
119. In re J.M.M., 80 S.W.3d 232, 245 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).
120. In re A.V., 57 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. granted).
121. In re M.E.C., 66 S.W.3d 449, 457-58 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no. pet.).
122. In re M.S., 73 S.W.3d 537, 539-40 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet. granted).
123. In re G.C., 66 S.W.3d 517, 521-22 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
124. In re E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
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ceedings. The Houston Court of Appeals for the 14th District held that
the Family Code does not require a parent to have a certain level of com-
petency in a termination suit. In fact, the very competency evaluation
requested might be used as evidence for her termination based on her
mental ability to care for the children.
In the T.S.S. case, 2 5 a man provided emotional and financial support
for thirteen years following a divorce in which the parties to the divorce
were named joint managing conservators of a child born during the mar-
riage. After DNA evidence showed him not to be the biological father,
the man filed a voluntary termination suit. The majority opinion of the
San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the man was attempting to reliti-
gate an issue essential to the prior divorce decree and was, therefore,
barred by collateral estoppel. A dissent stated that nothing was being
relitigated as one must first establish a parent-child relationship, or at
least have the presumption of one, before it can be terminated.
The case In re K.C.,126 the San Antonio Court of Appeals sitting en
banc overruled its own decision from only a few months earlier in the
case In re R.H.127 In the K.C. case, a mother missed the first two days of
the trial terminating her parental rights. Her attorney was present for the
entire trial. The trial court overruled her motion for new trial, and the
court of appeals affirmed. In the R.H. case, the court of appeals held that
in a termination case, when the parent fails to attend his or her own trial
but their attorney does attend, and the failure of the parent to attend
prevents the attorney from presenting material evidence on the parent's
behalf, then Craddock128 should apply.' 29 Overruling the prior opinion
in R.H., the court of appeals stated in K.C. that the attorney appeared
and a trial on the merits was completed so there was no default, and
hence, Craddock did not apply.' 30
In the case In re E.L.Y.,' 31 the Waco Court of Appeals held that an
indigent parent whose rights are terminated is entitled to be appointed
appellate counsel.' 32 The court of appeals held that appointed counsel
may file an Anders 33 brief if counsel determines that there are no issues
for appeal, but it must be in substantial compliance with Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure section 38.1.
In the case In re H.R.,134 an indigent mother's trial attorney undertook
steps to preserve her right to appeal following the entry of an order ter-
minating her parental rights. The trial court found that the mother was
indigent but ordered her to pay $75 a month toward her appeal. Later,
125. In re T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
126. In re K.C., 88 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
127. In re R.H., 75 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
128. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939).
129. In re R.H., 75 S.W.3d at 130.
130. In re K.C., 88 S.W.3d at 279.
131. In re E.L.Y., 69 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
132. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013 (Vernon 2002).
133. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
134. In re H.R., 87 S.W.3d 691 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
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the district clerk's office denied the attorney's request for payment, stat-
ing that he was never officially appointed. 35 The San Antonio Court of
Appeals held that the trial court had no discretion to order the mother to
pay fees toward her appeal after finding her indigent, and because termi-
nation appeals are accelerated, the trial attorney for the indigent parent is
usually in the best position to be appointed as appellate counsel and pre-
serve the parent's right to appeal. In this case, the attorney had filed all
of the necessary documents with the appellate court as the mother's ap-
pellate counsel, and there was no order entered allowing him to withdraw
as counsel. 136
As to affidavits of relinquishment, the Austin Court of Appeals held
that a mother's affidavit was voluntary even though she signed it while
she was emotionally unstable. 137 In the D.R.L.M.138 case, a mother
named a specific family to become managing conservators of her children
in the affidavit for relinquishment. When the trial court named a differ-
ent family, the mother argued that the affidavit was no longer voluntary.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected her argument holding that the
trial court is required to appoint the person designated in an affidavit
unless it finds that the person named would not be in the child's best
interest. Additionally, there was no language in the affidavit that condi-
tioned her relinquishment upon the naming of the requested family as
managing conservators.
IV. PATERNITY
There were only a few significant paternity cases during the survey pe-
riod. In In re M.C.,13 9 Randall and Mona were married in July 1999.
They separated in December 1999, and less than a month later, Mona had
twin boys. She filed for divorce from Randall on February 1, 2000. Ran-
dall's pleadings included a claim that he and Mona were the parents of
the twins; whereas, Mona's pleadings contained an allegation that Ran-
dall was not their biological father, and she even attached DNA test re-
sults to her pleadings excluding Randall as the father.140 However, in
contradiction to the DNA test results, the trial court found that Mona and
Randall were the parents of the twins and provided for their conservator-
ship, possession and support.
Mona appealed because the trial court had prevented her from
presenting evidence to rebut the presumption, based upon their marriage,
that he was the father of the children. She also complained of the trial
court's refusal to hear evidence regarding in vitro fertilization and
135. Id. at 702.
136. Id.
137. Lumbis v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 65 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
138. In re D.L.R.M., 84 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).
139. In re M.C., 65 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet.).
140. Id. at 190.
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whether Randall had properly consented to the procedure. 14'
The trial court refused to allow Mona to testify regarding the in vitro
fertilization and instructed her and her counsel that "the court was not
going to listen to testimony that she thought her children were not Ran-
dall's.' 142 Mona was allowed to present a bill of exceptions to present
evidence that "(1) would have rebutted the presumption of paternity set
out by Section 151.002; (2) the children were conceived via in vitro fertili-
zation and not artificial insemination; and (3) the facts and circumstances
surrounding the conception were different from the circumstances sup-
porting findings of ratification in cases under consideration by the trial
court .... ",143
The court of appeals reversed based upon the trial court's refusal to
allow Mona to present evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity.
The court pointed out that the presumptions of paternity contained
within the Texas Family Code are rebuttable and that Mona had the bur-
den of proof. The trial court's refusal to allow her to present any evi-
dence to carry her burden was error and, as such, the case was reversed
and remanded.
In Ince v. Ince,144 Derek and Virginia were divorced in 1987, and the
decree stated that they were parents of one child born during the mar-
riage. There were three later modification actions involving support and
possession. After eleven years, Derek petitioned the court for paternity
testing for medical reasons. When the results came back excluding him as
the biological father, Derek filed a bill of review.
The court of appeals stated the standard for a bill of review as requiring
the "complainant [to] file a petition alleging factually and with particular-
ity that, through no negligence of his own, he was prevented from assert-
ing a meritorious defense to the original cause of action as a result of
fraud, accident, wrongful act or official mistake."' 45 The court went on to
explain the following:
Fraud, as it applies to attacks upon final judgment, may be either
intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic fraud relates to issues that were
presented and resolved-or could have been resolved-in the former
action. Fraudulent instruments and perjured testimony are consid-
ered intrinsic fraud because these are matters presented to and con-
sidered by the court in the original proceeding. Extrinsic fraud, on
the other hand, is wrongful conduct practiced outside of the adver-
sary trial-such as keeping a party away from court, making false
promises of compromise, denying a party knowledge of the suit-
that affects the manner in which the judgment is procured. Only ex-
trinsic fraud supports a bill of review.146
141. Id. at 190-91.
142. Id. at 192.
143. Id. at 193; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.002 (Vernon 2002).
144. Ince v. Ince, 58 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.).




The court of appeals found that Virginia's concealment of the true
identity of the father of the child could only amount to intrinsic fraud
and, therefore, could not support a bill of review. As such, the trial
court's dismissal of the case was affirmed.
V. CONSERVATORSHIP
There were several cases during the Survey period that tested the limits
of the parental presumption. In In re C.R.T, 1 4 7 the mother and father
were divorced in 1995, at which time they were appointed joint managing
conservators of their child. Then in 1998, they left their child to be raised
by the child's aunt. The mother also left two other children with the aunt.
The aunt took the children because the "parents were homeless drug ad-
dicts unable to feed them.' 48
In 1999, the mother decided to live with her parents in their three bed-
room house and worked for them at their service station for room and
board. 149 The aunt eventually filed to be the managing conservator.
Temporary orders were entered requiring the mother and father to pay
support for their children. The matter eventually was heard by the court
for final trial, and the aunt was appointed as the managing conservator.
The court of appeals stated the parental presumption as requiring:
the court to presume that the best interests of a child lay in ap-
pointing a biological parent. Yet, the presumption is rebuttable. For
instance, proof that such an appointment would significantly impair
the child's physical health or emotional development negates it, as
does proof that the parent voluntarily relinquished actual care, cus-
tody or control of the child for one year and the best interests of the
child would be served by appointing a nonparent as conservator. 50
However, the court went on to state that the parental presumption has
no application in a modification case, and the resulting burden on the
movant is lower than it would be in an original action.' 51 The effect of
these rules in the C.R. T. case was that the aunt had to overcome the pa-
rental presumption as to two children because her action was an original
action regarding them. As to the child of the mother and father, the pa-
rental presumption was not applicable, which reduced the burden.
However, in the final analysis, the court did not seem concerned with
the differences in the burdens of proof and went to great lengths to ex-
amine the evidence so as to support the trial court's findings as to all
three children. The court of appeals stated that:
[Mother] lacked ready means to personally support her offspring and
expected others to care for them is testimony that she failed to inves-
tigate the medical condition of her children until told to do so by [the
147. In re C.R.T., 61 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet denied).
148. Id. at 64.
149. Id. at 64-65.
150. Id. at 65-66 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 66.
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aunt], that this 31 year old person could not legally drive her children
anywhere (such as to school or to a doctor's office) since she had no
driver's license, and that she had been dependent upon intoxicating
substances for more than the majority of the lives of [the children.]
Failing to support one's children has been considered indicia illus-
trating that appointment of the parent would significantly impair the
child's physical health. So too has evidence of physical abuse, severe
neglect, abandonment, drug and alcohol abuse, and very immoral be-
havior been deemed indicative impairment upon the child's health.
[Mother]'s drug problem, her abandoning [the children] ... her fail-
ure to provide support to [the children], her utter dependence upon
her parents for her well-being, and her exhibition of a want of per-
sonal responsibility and emotional development are indicia of like
ilk. They too evince potential impairment of health and emotional
development sufficient to justify the appointment of a third-party as
managing conservator instead of a parent. They also provide evi-
dence rebutting the presumption that Darla should be the managing
conservator .... And, when coupled with the evidence of stability,
support, and nurturing offered by [the aunt], we cannot but find that
the trial court's appointment of [the aunt] constituted a positive im-
provement, furthered the best interests of the children, and exempli-
fied a legitimate exercise of discretion, the one for whom the parents
had been appointment of [the aunt] constituted a positive improve-
ment, furthered the best interests of the children, and exemplified a
legitimate exercise of discretion. 152
Based upon this analysis, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
designation of the aunt as the managing conservator of the children.
In In re S.W.H., 53 the mother had a daughter in July 1997, while on
probation. Shortly after the birth, she tested positive for illegal sub-
stances during a routine urinalysis. The recommendation by her proba-
tion officer was incarceration. On April 7, 1998, the mother was
incarcerated and left her child with friends, with the permission of her
CPS worker. The mother was released to a halfway house on January 7,
1999, and on January 22, 1999, shortly before the mother was released
from the halfway house, her friends filed suit to have themselves ap-
pointed sole managing conservators of the child.
The court of appeals stated that "a nonparent seeking custody may re-
but the parental presumption and prevail over a parent by showing that
appointing the parent as conservator would significantly impair the
child's health or development or by showing that the parent voluntarily
relinquished physical possession of the child for one year or more."'1 54
The court of appeals found that the mother clearly did not relinquish
her child for the requisite one year period, finding that the one year was
up in March 1999, and the mother filed her answer to the suit in February
1999.
152. Id. at 67-68.
153. In re S.H.W., 72 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
154. Id. at 775-776.
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The trial court could still be upheld if the nonparent offered "evidence
of specific actions or omissions of the parent that demonstrate an award
of custody to the parent would result in physical or emotional harm to the
child. ' 155 Although there was evidence of the mother's past behavior and
drug history, the court of appeals noted that "evidence of past miscon-
duct may not, by itself, be sufficient to show present parental unfitness as
required to appoint a nonparent as conservator over a parent." 156
The court found that the mother's improvement and recovery pre-
vented the friends from overcoming the parental presumption. The court
of appeals concluded that:
in the face of uncontroverted evidence that [Mother] has remained
clean and sober since March 1998, has maintained steady employ-
ment, keeps a safe and stable home environment, and has bonded
with [the child] during visitations since [Mother] was released from
treatment in 1999, we do not find evidence in the record that
[Mother]'s appointment as managing conservator would significantly
impair [the child]'s physical health or emotional development. 57
In In re K.R.P.,158 the mother and father had a child in 1993. In 1996,
the parents separated and the father moved in with his girlfriend. The
father began serving a four-year criminal sentence only a few months af-
ter he began to live with the other woman. In 1999, the father was re-
leased and went to live with his wife (he had married his girlfriend by
proxy while in prison), but that only lasted a few weeks, and the father
moved out.159 In 2000, his wife filed for divorce and sought managing
conservatorship of her step-child. A temporary hearing was held and the
mother testified that the child should stay with the step-mother. Father
was appointed a temporary possessory conservator, and the mother and
step-mother were appointed joint managing conservators.
In 2001, the court held a bench trial, after which the step-mother was
appointed the sole managing conservator, and the mother and father
were appointed possessory conservators. The mother and father
appealed.160
The mother's arguments were dismissed quickly because she never
sought custody of the child. Since she was not seeking custody, the pa-
rental presumption was not applicable. However, the father had filed a
motion seeking custody of the child.
The court of appeals found that appointment of the father as the man-
aging conservator would significantly impair the child's physical health
and emotional development, even though the child, over twelve years of
age, testified she wanted to live with her father. The court pointed out
155. Id. at 777.
156. Id. at 778 (citing In re M.W., 959 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, writ
denied)).
157. Id. at 779.
158. In re K.R.P., 80 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
159. Id. at 672.
160. Id. at 672-73.
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that there was evidence that: 1) the father had abused alcohol in the past;
2) the mother had called the police six different times when she lived with
the father due to his violent and assaultive behavior; 3) step-mother testi-
fied that the father was physically and emotionally abusive toward her; 4)
"the child had been diagnosed with asthma and/or allergies," yet her fa-
ther smoked in the house during his possession; 5) the father showed little
or no interest in the child's school and activities; and 6) the father was
behind $10,000.00 in child support for another child he had fathered
outside of marriage. 161
In light of such facts, the court of appeals found that the evidence had
rebutted the parental presumption.
The case of Roby v. Adams' 62 is similar to the United States Supreme
Court case of Troxel v. Granville163 in that the mother had died leaving
the father to raise two children. After the mother's death, the father re-
duced the maternal grandparent's access to the children, and after a
while, he refused to allow them any contact with the children. After two
social studies and a final trial, the Texas court granted the maternal
grandparents court-ordered periods of possession. 164
The court of appeals overruled the trial court based upon the parental
presumption and the fact that there was no evidence that the father was
not a fit parent. Absent such evidence, the decision of whether to allow
or not allow intergenerational relationships must be left to the parent to
make.
VI. JURISDICTION/VENUE
Going hand-in-hand with the relocation issue are the jurisdictional is-
sues raised by mobile parents. Before a court can even address the relo-
cation issues, it must first determine if it has jurisdiction to do so. The
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), as
opposed to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), has
now been in effect in Texas since 1999.165 One difference in interpreta-
tion of the UCCJA among the states, that the UCCJEA was meant to
remedy, was the effect of continuing exclusive jurisdiction, which is more
and more important in an increasingly mobile society.
In In re McCormick,166 the mother and father were divorced in Texas
in 1995. The mother was appointed managing conservator, and the father
was appointed possessory conservator. In September 2001, the child be-
gan living with the father in New Mexico. In a modification action in
Texas court, the father was appointed the primary conservator, and in
February 2001, the father moved with the child to Sylvia, Kansas. In
161. Id. at 676.
162. Roby v. Adams, 68 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied).
163. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
164. Roby, 68 S.W.3d at 823.
165. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.001 (Vernon 2002).
166. In re McCormick, 87 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
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March 2001, the mother apparently filed two petitions to modify, one was
dismissed, and the father filed a plea to the jurisdiction as to the other.
After a hearing, the trial court found that Texas was not an inconve-
nient forum for the father and that Texas had continuing exclusive juris-
diction over the case. 167 The court relied upon Texas Family Code
section 152.202, which provides that:
(1) a court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the
child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent,
have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evi-
dence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care,
protection, training, and personal relationships; or
(2) a court of this state or a court of another state determines that
the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do
not presently reside in this state. 168
The court of appeals analyzed the facts of the case including the fa-
ther's testimony that in Kansas, the child was living across the street from
his grandparents, who watched the child when the father was not able to,
the child had relatives in Kansas he played with, and the child attended
school and church in Kansas. The child's doctor and counselor were in
Kansas. 169
The court pointed out that Clovis, New Mexico, was located only eight
to ten miles from the Parmer County courthouse, where the initial cus-
tody proceeding was maintained, and Kansas was not the child's home
state. The mother lived in Texas, previously had her possession in Texas,
and she testified that the witnesses necessary for a hearing on custody
would be herself, her current husband, Dr. Gaspar of Clovis, New Mex-
ico, and her family in Texas, including her parents, brothers, and sister-in-
law. Based upon these facts, the court of appeals stated it was a close one
but that the trial court did not err in finding that the child still had a
significant connection with Texas, and therefore, Texas still had exclusive
continuing jurisdiction.17 0
In In re Bellamy,17 1 the Texas Attorney General's office established
paternity in 1996, and the parents were appointed joint managing conser-
vators with the mother having the exclusive right to establish the child's
primary residence. In March 2000, the Texas Attorney General's office
filed a motion to modify child support, and the father responded with his
own counter-petition seeking appointment as the child's primary conser-
vator, which was granted. It was uncontested that the mother and child
were residents of Louisiana, and Louisiana was the child's home state.
However, the father lived in Texas. 172
167. Id. at 748.
168. Id. at 749 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202 (Vernon 2002)).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. In re Bellamy, 67 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
172. Id. at 483.
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Under the UCCJEA, Texas retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction
over a case if Texas made the initial custody determination, "until a court
of [Texas] determines that neither the child nor one parent has a signifi-
cant connection with [Texas] and that substantial evidence is no longer
available in [Texas] concerning the child's care, protection, training, and
personal relationships."1 73
The court of appeals reviewed the facts relating to the child's connec-
tion with the state of Texas, including the fact that she previously at-
tended school in Texas and lived only a few miles from her grandparents
in Texas. She was picked up for school at her maternal grandparents'
home in Texas. Her father remained a resident of Texas since the original
decree was entered in 1996. The father also paid his child support and
was actively involved in the child's life. The home study conducted by
agreement of the parties for this case was done by a group in Texas. Fi-
nally, the mother took the child to a psychologist in Texas.174 The court of
appeals found these facts were sufficient to support a finding that the
child had a significant connection with Texas, and substantial evidence
existed in Texas regarding her care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.
In In re Brilliant,175 the child was born in Massachusetts in 1999. Her
parents never married, but lived together in Massachusetts until the fa-
ther moved to Texas in April 2000. The move to Texas was planned, and
the father took all of the family's belongings, except for some clothing for
the mother and child. The mother and child stayed in Massachusetts with
the child's maternal grandmother and would write to the father telling
him how she was looking forward to her new life in Texas. The mother
and child arrived in Texas in June of 2000.176
After arriving in Texas the mother and child spent a total of forty-five
days there, after which they went back to Massachusetts in violation of a
temporary restraining order the father had obtained when the mother
started talking to him about going back to Massachusetts. After arriving
back in Massachusetts, the mother filed a paternity action there and filed
a plea to the jurisdiction regarding the case in Texas that Father had filed.
Ultimately, the Texas court found it had jurisdiction and entered a default
judgment appointing the father as sole managing conservator when the
mother failed to appear or file an answer. 177
The mother contended that her stay in Texas was merely a temporary
absence, as that term is used in Texas Family Code section 152.102(7),
and therefore did not affect Massachusetts' status as the child's home
state. The court of appeals disagreed and found that the child had no
home state since they had moved to Texas but had not stayed for six
173. Id. at 485; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.202(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).
174. In re Bellamy, 67 S.W.3d at 487.
175. In re Brilliant, 86 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
176. Id. at 682.
177. Id. at 683.
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months. If a child has no home state, the next jurisdictional basis is "sig-
nificant connection" jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction and Enforcement Act. 178
When the father filed his suit in Texas, the child had been alive for a
little over thirteen months and had lived all but forty-five days of it in
Massachusetts. The court of appeals, however, upheld the trial court's
exercise of jurisdiction based upon significant connections. The court of
appeals stated that ". . . Texas was a repository of substantial evidence
concerning [the] present or future care, training, and personal relation-
ships"'179 of the child. However, the court of appeals found that the
mother's plea to the jurisdiction was an entry of appearance, and there-
fore, it was error to enter a default judgment. Therefore, the case was
reversed and remanded on that basis.
Both the McCormick and the Bellamy cases stated that in jurisdictional
issues involving different states, to the extent that the provisions of Texas
Family Code section 155.201 regarding the mandatory transfer of cases
conflicts with the UCCJEA, the UCCJEA controls. However, if the
transfer is within the state, from county to county, you must still look to
Chapter 155 to determine if the case must be transferred. In In re
S.G.S.,180 the Tarrant county trial court refused to transfer a case to Col-
lin County, at the request of the father, even though the mother and child
had resided in Collin County for fifteen months. The court of appeals
reversed, finding that the transfer was mandatory upon the father's timely
motion to transfer.
Then in In re Knotts,181 the child had lived with the mother in Rusk
County for four years before moving back with his father. After living
with his father for two months, the father filed a petition in Titus County,
which was the original decree county. The trial court transferred the case
to Rusk County and the court of appeals affirmed, stating that the trans-
fer was mandatory.
178. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.201(a)(2)(A) (Vernon 2002).
179. Id. at 692.
180. In re S.G.S., 53 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
181. In re Knotts, 62 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
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